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We augment a standard dictator game to investigate how preferences for an environmental 
project relate to willingness to limit others’ choices. We explore this issue by distinguishing 
three student groups: economists, environmental economists, and environmental social 
scientists. We find that people are generally disposed to grant freedom of choice, but only 
within certain limits.  In addition, our results are in  line with the  widely held belief that 
economists are more selfish than other people. Yet,  against  the  notion  of  consumer 
sovereignty, economists are not less likely to restrict others’ choices and impose restrictions 
closer to their own preferences than the other student groups. 
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“The power to do good is also the power to do harm.” 
Milton Friedman (Capitalism and Freedom, 1962) 
 
1. Introduction 
There exist many areas within modern society where people make decisions involving others’ 
welfare. Examples include households’ decision-makers, policy makers, community leaders, 
and firm’s managers. Accordingly, a number  of experimental studies  in both social 
psychology and economics have  investigated how individuals behave when they are 
responsible not only for their own wellbeing, but also for someone else’s wellbeing (see, e.g., 
Kerr and MacCoun 1985; Charness 2000; Daruvala 2007; Charness and Jackson 2009; 
Eriksen and Kvaløy 2010).
1 In comparison, relatively little is known about the individuals’ 
willingness to voluntarily assume responsibility for others’ welfare when what the others can 
gain bears no consequences for the decision makers’ monetary payoff but can affect a third 
party.
2
We place each dictator in a group with three other participants and augment the standard 
game so that each dictator makes three choices.
 Yet, trading off the welfare of one group against that of another is a decision that both 
individuals and policy  makers around the world often face. In this paper, we provide 
experimental evidence on this issue by using a dictator game with an environmental 
organization (the WWF) as the recipient.  
3
                                                 
1 For example, Charness and Jackson (2009) found that in a Stag Hunt game almost one third of the people 
played a less risky strategy when choosing for a group than when playing only for themselves.  Similarly, 
Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009) showed that individuals take less risk with other people’s money than with their 
own. 
 First, he decides on his individual donation 
to a particular WWF project with the aim to save the orangutans. Then, he chooses a donation 
for all members of his group (including himself). Finally, he is given the opportunity to 
dictate the other group members’ minimum donation, thereby restricting their choice of how 
much to keep for themselves. Several independent researchers have studied the “individual” 
dictator game and found that, contrary to the predictions of standard theory, many dictators 
give a substantial share of their endowment to other subjects (for a survey, see Camerer 
2 Oxoby (2006) explored people’s preferences over limiting the choice sets of themselves and others in a 
public goods experiment and found that individuals are willing to exchange liberty (i.e. unlimited choice) for 
efficiency. In a similar setting, Bolle and Vogel (2010) observed that giving one group member (the allocator) 
the power to decide on all group members’ contributions enhances efficiency, but at the same time creates 
inequality because the allocator forces the others to contribute more than he does. 
3 In the basic version of the dictator game one player is endowed by the experimenter with a certain amount 
of money and asked to share it with another player who has no choice to make.  
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2003). By extending the dictator game so as to include the two “collective” choices (i.e., 
choices on behalf of others) described above, we are able to shed light on the following 
questions: How does having to dictate  a decision to  the group affect dictators’ choice 
behavior?
4
Although theories of social preferences suggest that individuals are sensitive to the others’ 
wellbeing and value others’ rights, it is not completely obvious in our game what ‘pro-social’ 
behavior would advocate because the dictator may harm his group-members in order to help 
the WWF. No trade-off between humans and animals would arise if the dictators’ and his 
fellow members’ preferences were aligned. Conversely, consider a dictator who is willing to 
donate some money to the WWF project, but expects the others to be payoff-maximizers. 
Then, when dictating a choice for all members of his group, such a dictator may respect the 
others’ preferences albeit in contrast to his own. On the other hand, paternalism may induce 
the dictator to impose a donation on him and others with an eye to his own preferences. The 
issue of the willingness to restrict the others’ choices in favor of the environment is even 
more  ambiguous. Indeed, while some have argued that people must face restrictions of 
liberties and choices in order to preserve social order, others have insisted on the importance 
of unrestricted choices. Kant’s categorical imperative, for instance, suggests that a person 
should not impose restrictions on others that he would resist if they were imposed on him.
 How does the donation imposed on the whole group differ from the restriction 
placed on the others’ choice set? Will dictators limit the other individuals’ choice sets when 
their own and the others’ earnings are unrelated? To paraphrase Friedman’s (1962) opening 
quote, will the dictators decide to the good of the orangutan project at the expenses of the 
payoff-maximizing choice of their fellow group members?  
5
The questions we pose may have different answers depending on people’s education. For 
example, there is empirical evidence that students of economics behave differently from other 
people (see, e.g., Lanteri 2008, for a survey of relevant work). Already in the early eighties, 
Marwell and Ames (1981) observed that in public goods experiments, economists free ride 
more than non-economists. They offered two explanations for this finding. First, students 
who are particularly concerned with economic incentives might self-select into economics. 
Second, economics students might adapt their behavior over time to the basic axioms of the 
  
                                                 
4 There exists some experimental literature that has explored individual versus team decisions (see, e.g., 
Cason and Mui 1997; Masclet et al. 2009). Differently from us, this strand of research focuses on whether 
decisions made by individuals differ systematically from decisions made by the group via voting or discussion. 
5  See White (2004) for a detailed account of Kant’s ethics  and its interpretation in terms of homo 
economicus’ decision-making process.  
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0894 
 
theories they study. These two explanations are known as the selection and learning 
hypotheses, respectively.
6
Economists are also traditionally seen as being more libertarian than others. The message that 
freedom has a value is embedded in economics. As suggested by the opening quote, Milton 
Friedman took a clear position against “doing good with other people’s money”, thereby 
favoring individual freedom. Sen (1988) drew attention to the instrumental importance of 
freedom (as a means to other ends) as well as to its intrinsic worth. Even basic courses of 
economics begin by assuming consumer sovereignty. This can be traced back to Adam 
Smith’s proposition (1776 [1937], p. 625): “Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all 
production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be 
necessary for promoting that of the consumer”.  It is therefore of interest  to  address our 
research questions distinguishing not only students who are expected to be more prone to 
protect the environment from other students, but also students who are studying economics 
(and business administration) from non-economists. To this aim, we recruited students from 
two populations at the University of Gothenburg: the Environmental Social Science program 
and the School of Business, Economics and Law. Some of the students in the Environmental 
Social Science program specialize in economics or business administration, and even take the 
same courses as the students at the School of Business, Economics, and Law. Thus, we 
further categorize our students based on their specialization, and our final data set comprises 
three categories: i) economists, ii) environmental economists, and iii) environmental social 
scientists with no economics background. 
  
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that have examined the willingness to 
restrict others’ choices of economists and non-economists. Some studies, however, have 
shown that there is a strong correlation between economists’ policy positions and their 
ideological values (e.g. Fuchs et al. 1998; Ayer 2001). We extend this line of inquiry by 
examining whether economists, influenced by the libertarian attitudes prevalent in 
economics, are less eager to restrict others’ choices, and whether factors other than education 
– such as gender and political preferences – can explain the willingness to restrict others’ 
choices. 
 
                                                 
6 Other laboratory experiments shedding light on the difference between economists and non-economists 
include Carter and Irons (1991), Frank et al. (1993), Fehr et al. (2006), and Rubinstein (2006). Field experiments 
have been performed by, e.g., Frank et al. (1996), and Frey and Meier (2003). 
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2. The experiment  
2.1 Subject pool 
Our sample consists of one hundred and two undergraduate students enrolled in two different 
faculties at the University of Gothenburg: the School of Business, Economics and Law, and 
the  Environmental  Social  Science (ESS)  program.  Students  at the  School  of Business, 
Economics and Law all study or have studied economics and business administration; we 
shall refer to them as “economists”. Students from the ESS program undertake a common 
first year, which includes courses in different environmental topics and in natural science, 
and then they enter the main stage of their study and specialize in one of the following areas: 
economics, business administration, political science, human geography, and human ecology. 
This means that some of these students also study economics and business administration. 
We control for this by dividing our sample into the following three groups: (i) Business 
School students or economists (henceforth EC), (ii) environmental economists (henceforth 
ENV-EC), and (iii) environmental social scientists without economic background (henceforth 
ENV-NO EC). 
The students were recruited in classrooms during lectures hours and via e-mails from lists 
provided by the university administration and students unions. Table 1 summarizes the 
number of observations for each group.  
Table 1: Number of observations (individuals) for each group  
Student group  Observations 
School of Business, Economics, and Law (EC)        55 
Environmental Social Science program         
-  Specializing in economics/business (ENV-EC)  20 
-  Specializing in other subjects (ENV-NO EC)  27 
 
2.2 Design and procedures 
The experiment was conducted late 2009 and early 2010 at the University of Gothenburg, and 
run as a paper and pencil experiment. In the recruitment process, the students were told that 
the experiment was about the environment and that they would earn a show-up of 60 SEK.
7
                                                 
7 At the time of the experiment 7 SEK = 1 USD. 
 
Possibilities to earn additional money in the experiment were also announced.  
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0896 
 
The experiment was divided into two independent parts. Part 1, the main part, consisted of 
the augmented dictator game as described in the introduction. Part 2 involved a questionnaire 
with  some questions about the  students’  background and their views of environmental 
policies. We will now describe the main part of the experiment.  
Each participant was told that he would be randomly assigned to a group of four people, and 
that  his  other group members  (either business school students  or environmental social 
scientists) could be from any of the sessions we were conducting, including the one he was 
participating in. Each participant had to make three independent choices, all related to the 
amount to be donated to a WWF project with the aim to save the orangutans. For each choice, 
he received an endowment of 150 SEK. The students were informed that the donated money 
would be paid in full to the WWF. To ensure credibility, a receipt for the entire amount 
donated and the individual donations were made available when the participants came and 
collected their earnings. The receipt for the entire amount donated was also posted on a 
university  announcement board.  All participants knew about this before making any 
decisions. 
The three decisions that the participants made were the following. The first choice was an 
individual choice: each subject decided how much he wanted to donate to the orangutan 
project individually and independently of the others’ donations. We regard this choice as 
revealing people’s preferences for the environmental good. The second and third choices 
were collective in the sense that each subject decided on behalf of his group. In the second 
choice,  each subject decided  the  donation level which would be applied to every  group 
member (including himself). In the third choice, the subject decided the minimum amount that 
the other persons in his group (excluding himself) had to donate (if at all) to the orangutan 
project; therefore, he could impose a restriction on the others’  choices  without direct 
monetary consequences for himself.
8
                                                 
8 Individuals made choices 2 and 3 prior to knowing whether or not they would be in the role of dictator. This 
implies use of the strategy method. Previous experiments have found no difference in behavior between the 
strategy and the play method (see, e.g., Brandts and Charness 2000; Oxoby and McLeish 2004). 
 Note that the first choice concerned only the decision 
maker, the second concerned both the decision maker and the other group members, while the 
third choice only affected the others. Additionally, while in the second choice the decision 
maker was forced to dictate a decision for the group, in the third choice he was free to decide 
whether to restrict the others’ choice set or not.  
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Final earnings were based on one of these three choices. If the second or third choice was 
selected for payment, one of the four group members was randomly assigned the role of 
group’s dictator. If the third choice was the decisive one, then the chosen dictator donated an 
amount equal to his choice 1 and determined the minimum amount that the others had to 
donate; if any of the other group members were willing to give more than this minimum, their 
preferences were respected in the sense that they donated according to their choice 1. All 
subjects were informed about these payment procedures. In addition to the above choices, we 
elicited the subjects’ beliefs about the other group members’ donations in choice 1.
9
We conducted six sessions. At the beginning of each session, the subjects received general 




 After the experimenter 
read these general instructions aloud, two big envelopes – one labeled ‘part 1’ and the other 
labeled ‘part 2’ – and one small envelope were distributed. The envelope labeled ‘part 1’ (2) 
contained the instructions and the decision forms for the first (second) part of the experiment. 
The small envelope contained a paper slip with a code for later identification in order to be 
able to distribute earnings. After the experimenter’s signal, the participants could remove all 
contents from the envelope marked as ‘part 1’, read the enclosed instructions (which were 
also read aloud by the experimenter), and complete the corresponding decision forms. Then, 
they had to put back the decision forms into the ‘part 1’ envelope. After all ‘part 1’ envelopes 
were collected, the participants could take the instructions and decision forms out of the 
envelope marked as ‘part 2’. The subjects were therefore informed about the questionnaire 
only after they had completed the first part. When everyone had filled in the questionnaire, 
they had to put it back into the ‘part 2’ envelope and return the envelope to the experimenter. 
Payments were carried out some days later, subsequent to the formation of the four-person 
groups.  
The results are organized  in three subsections. First, we present a general overview and 
analysis of average behavior  for the whole sample of 102 participants. Then, we study 
whether and to what extent the amount of money donated to the WWF varies with the task 
                                                 
9 We used a simple incentive mechanism where students could gain additional money if they guessed their 
group members’ donations correctly.  
10 The complete set of instructions and decision forms is documented in the appendix. 
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and the field of study. Finally, we investigate how the individual choice relates to each of the 
two collective choices. 
3.1 Whole sample analysis 
The results presented here are for the whole sample. Table 2 displays means (and standard 
deviations) of the amounts donated to the WWF in each of the three choices. In addition, the 
last row (choice 4) reports descriptive statistics of the beliefs about the others’ individual 
donations. 
Table 2: Whole sample: average response for each choice (standard deviation in parentheses) 
Choice  Description  Mean 
1  Standard dictator game  112 (48) 
2  Dictating for the whole group  99 (49) 
3  Restricting other group members’ choice set  52 (53) 
4  Beliefs about what others, on average, donate in choice 1  93 (40) 
We start by comparing choices 1 and 2 so as to investigate whether, and if so how, having to 
decide for the whole group affects individual choice behavior. Figure 1 shows the distribution 
of the difference in donation between choice 1 and choice 2.
11

















-200 -100 0 100 200
Choice 1 - Choice 2
 
                                                 
11 Computing such difference is justified by the fact that each participant made all three choices. 
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Result 1: Decision makers tend to reduce their individual donation when they know that their 
decision applies to all group members, but still a large fraction of participants do not change 
their behavior. 
Support for this result comes from Table 2 and Figure 1. The table indicates that, compared to 
individual choice 1, donations decrease, on average, by 12 percent when participants have to 
dictate a decision  to the entire group. This reduction is statistically significant using a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p-value = 0.000). At the same time, the large proportion of zeros 
in Figure 1 reveals that a majority of decision makers (64%) donate the same amount to the 
WWF in choices 1 and 2. Figure 1 also shows that it is very unlikely that an individual 
increases his donation when he knows that everyone in his group must donate the same. 
Next,  we explore how  decisions differ depending on whether the individual dictates the 
whole group’ donation (choice 2) or the others’, but not his own, minimum donation (choice 
3). Note that, given Result 1, this issue conveys information about the relationship between 
individual donations  (choice 1)  and restrictions  (choice 3)  as well.  Figure 2 draws the 
histogram of the difference between choice 2 and choice 3. 


















-100 -50 0 50 100 150
Choice 2 - Choice 3
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Result 2: Compared to the donation they dictate to the whole group, the decision makers 
place a lower restriction on the choices of others.  
A first support for this result comes from Table 2, which reveals that the average restriction 
on the others’ donation  (choice 3)  is about 50 percent  lower than the average donation 
dictated to the  whole  group  (choice 2). A Wilcoxon  signed-rank test  confirms that the 
reduction is statistically significant (p-value = 0.000). Further support for Result 2 is provided 
by Figure 2, showing that the distribution of the difference between choice 2 and choice 3 is 
skewed to the left (there are relatively few negative values). More specifically, 63% of the 
participants dictate a donation to the group that is greater than the donation that they impose, 
as a minimum, on the others. In the light of Result 1, this implies that most participants prefer 
restricting others to donate a minimum amount which is much smaller than their own 
donation. 
We conclude this section by considering the relationship between choices in the standard 
dictator game and beliefs about other dictators’ choices. 
Result 3: Most subjects believe that the others donate, on average, less than themselves. 
Table 2 clearly indicates that most subjects underestimate the amount that the other group 
members donate in the standard dictator game: beliefs about others’ donations are, on 
average, significantly smaller than actual donations (p-value = 0.000, Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test). 
Summarizing the results for the whole sample we conclude that slightly more than 1/3 of the 
decision makers reduce the individual amount donated to the WWF project when choosing 
for the whole group. The reduction is even more frequent and pronounced if individuals can 
restrict the choices of others without bearing any personal monetary consequences. Do note, 
however, that the average restriction level is still well above zero, suggesting that even 
though the decision makers do not want to impose their preferences on others, they still set a 
minimum to what the others have to donate. Finally, our finding on beliefs is in line with 
previous studies about positive self-image, according to which people think they are better 
than others (see e.g. Svenson 1981; Taylor and Brown 1988; Santos-Pinto and Sobel 2005). 
Explanations found in the literature are  that people,  in general,  overestimate their  own 
abilities, or that a positive self-image increases happiness. 
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3.2 Differences among student groups 
In this section, we shall focus on  the descriptive results for the three student groups 
participating in our experiment: economists (EC), environmental economists (ENV-EC), and 
environmental social scientists (ENV-NO EC). The average responses for each choice and 
student group are summarized in Table 3. Let us first consider whether and to what extent the 
student groups differ in their individual willingness to donate to the WWF project and in their 
beliefs about others’ willingness to donate. 
Table 3: Average response for each choice  and  student group  (standard deviation in 
parentheses) 
Choice  Description  ENV-NO EC  ENV-EC  EC 
1  Standard dictator game  132 (40)  123 (32)  101 (54) 
2  Dictating for the whole group  117 (41)  98 (38)  92 (55) 
3  Restricting other group members’ choice set  48 (52)  50 (51)  54 (56) 
4  Beliefs about what others, on average, donate  111 (37)  96 (38)  84 (42) 
Result  4:  Individual donations are, on average, smaller for economists  (EC)  than  for 
students  with an  environmental  studies  background  (ENV-NO EC and  ENV-EC),  but 
significantly so only for ENV-NO EC. 
As shown by choice 1 in Table 3, economists are, on average, more selfish than the two 
groups of students enrolled in the ESS program. However, a series of Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests reveal that only the difference between EC and ENV-NO EC is statistically significant 
(p-value = 0.025; the p-values for the comparisons between EC and ENV-EC and between 
ENV-EC and ENV-NO EC are 0.163 and 0.144, respectively).  Hence, the individual 
donations of environmental economists are in between those of the two other student groups. 
Result 5:  Both  economists  (EC)  and environmental economists (ENV-EC)  have lower 
expectations about the others’ generosity than environmental social scientists (ENV-NO EC). 
The last row in Table 3 provides a first support for this result. Further corroboration stems 
from a series of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, which reveal that the difference between EC and 
ENV-NO EC is statistically significant (p-value = 0.007), whereas the difference between EC 
and ENV-EC is not (p-value = 0.197). Moreover, the difference between ENV-EC and ENV-
NO EC is weakly significant (p-value = 0.090).  
Thus, although the object of the donation is an environmental good, the donation behavior of 
the environmental economists seems to be more similar to the behavior of the economists 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 08912 
 
than  to  that of the  environmental social scientists.  The same holds for the beliefs about 
others’ behavior. However, we are not able to distinguish whether this result is due to a 
selection effect or a learning effect. 
Concerning the two collective choices, Table 3 suggests that the differences in choice 2 
among student groups parallel the differences in choice 1 and beliefs: economists and 
environmental social scientists  dictate,  respectively, the lowest  and the highest  average 
donation to the group. Conversely, Table 3 points at a similarity among student groups with 
respect to the restriction placed on the others’ choice  set.  It is, however,  problematic to 
directly compare choices 2 and 3 across fields of studies because the student groups differ not 
only in the amounts individually donated to the WWF, but also in their expectations about the 
others’ donations. As it is likely that the collective choices depend on both one’s preferences 
and one’s expectations about the others’ donations, in the next section we will look in detail 
at the relationship between these various decisions.  
3.3 Choosing for the others 
To what extent does choosing the amount that other people have to donate to the WWF differ 
from choosing one’s own donation? To answer this question, we calculate the difference 
between the individual  donation and each of the two collective choices.  The bigger the 
difference, the more a subject is willing to modify his preferences when deciding for others. 
For those  who, in choice 3, decide not  to restrict the others’ choice set,  we  assume  a 
restriction of zero.
12
Table 4: Differences between one’s own choice and each collective choice (standard 
deviation in parentheses) 
 The results are reported in Table 4.  
Description  ENV- NO EC  ENV-EC  EC 
Donation in choice 1 – donation in choice 2   14.5 (53.4)  24.8 (36.7)  8.7 (37.9) 
Donation in choice 1 – restriction in choice 3  84.0 (59.9)  75.6 (54.3)  46.9 (60.2) 
Share of participants who restrict others’ choices  0.55  0.63  0.65 
Result 6: (i) Environmental economists (ENV-EC) are more willing than the other student 
groups to modify their individual donation when choosing for the whole group, although only 
the difference between ENV-EC and EC reaches significance. (ii) Economists (EC) are more 
likely than the other student groups to impose restrictions on the others’ donations that are 
closer to their own donation.  
                                                 
12 In the experiment, the minimum restriction that a participant could place on the others’ donation was 10 
SEK. Thus, if one wanted to place a zero-restriction, he had to opt for not restricting the others’ choices. 
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As to part (i) of the result, the first row in Table 4 shows that when choosing a donation for 
the whole group, environmental economists reduce, on average, their individual donation by 
almost 25 SEK, whereas environmental social scientists reduce it by 14.5 SEK, and 
economists by only 8.7 SEK. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests allow us to reject the hypothesis of 
equal reduction  when comparing ENV-EC and EC (p-value = 0.015), but not when 
comparing ENV-EC and ENV-NO EC (p-value = 0.477), or EC and ENV-NO EC (p-value = 
0.134). Since  the economists are the most selfish group in the individual choice, it may 
appear obvious that they deviate the least from their individual donation. However, the result 
is confirmed even if we compare the percentile change between choice 1 and choice 2, which 
is, on average, −20% (= −25/123 SEK) for ENV-EC, −11% (= −15/132) for ENV-NO EC, 
and only −9% (= −9/101) for EC. 
Turning to part (ii) of Result 6, the second row in Table 4 indicates that when imposing a 
restriction on others without direct monetary consequences for themselves, economists are 
the group which least departs from its individual donation. This difference among student 
groups is corroborated by Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing the distribution of the variable 
of interest (“choice 1 – choice 3”) for EC and ENV-EC (p-value = 0.058) and for EC and 
ENV-NO EC (p-value = 0.024).
13 Result 6-part (ii) may be explained by the fact that the 
share of those imposing a restriction is the highest for economists (see the last row in Table 
4).  However,  tests of equal proportion reveal that the  differences  in  these  shares  across 
student groups are not statistically significant.
14
We conclude our analysis by ascertaining  how the differences between individual and 
collective choices relate to the detected differences in expectations among the student groups, 
controlling for other factors. To this aim,  we  estimate  a  seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) model consisting of two equations. In the first equation, the dependent variable is the 
difference between own donation and group donation. In the second equation, the dependent 
variable is the difference between own donation and restriction on the others’ choice set. The 
two equations are estimated simultaneously, allowing for a correlation between their error 
terms. Included in each equation as independent variables are two dummy variables for the 
field of study (EC is the baseline), the difference between own donation and guess about the 
others’ donation, and interaction terms between this difference and the education dummy 
 
                                                 
13 No difference is detected between ENV-EC and ENV-NO EC (p-value = 0.531).  
14 This is true for all three comparisons: p-value = 0.825 for EC versus ENV-EC, p-value = 0.408 for EC 
versus ENV-NO EC, and p-value = 0.582 for ENV-EC versus ENV-NO EC.  
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variables. Control variables are personal factors such as political preferences, gender, and 
membership in an environmental organization.
15 The results are presented in Table 5.
16
Table 5. Regression models 
  
*, **, *** denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Notwithstanding the positive and significant correlation – which basically indicates that there 
is a strong correlation between choice 2 and choice 3 even after controlling for individual 
donations and beliefs – the two equations bear interesting dissimilarities. Equation 1’s results 
reveal that the larger the difference between the individual and the group choice, the larger 
the expected difference between one’s own donation and the average donation of the others. 
This implies that our participants tend to respect the others’ preferences: if they expect the 
others to donate less than themselves, they are likely to decrease their own donation when 
                                                 
15 As the students are very homogenous with respect to age and income, these characteristics are not included 
in the analysis. Moreover, the student groups differ considerably in political preferences, gender, and 
membership in environmental organizations. More specifically, there are significantly more right-wing 
supporters among the economists (58%) than among the environmental social scientists (10%); the 
environmental economists are more similar to the economists: 41% of them support the right-wing parties. The 
environmental social scientists are more likely to be women (85%) and members of an environmental 
organization (30%) than the economists  (51% and 3.6%, respectively) and the environmental economists (67% 
and 11%, respectively).  
16 We have also estimated the models without the personal characteristics (mainly because of the significant 
differences among the student groups). The statistical significance of the remaining coefficients remains the 
same. 
  Equation 1  Equation 2 
Dependent variable  Choice 1 – choice 2  Choice 1 –choice 3 






































Correlation  0.367 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence  Chi = 11.88, p-value = 0.001 
No. of obs.  102  102 
R2  0.274  0.131 
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they choose for the whole group. However, this respect for the others’ (expected) preferences 
varies with the field of study. This is indicated by the significantly positive coefficient of the 
two interaction terms: an increase in the difference between own donation and beliefs about 
others’ average donation by 10 SEK increases the dependent  variable  by  3.07  SEK for 
economists  and  by  7.35  SEK  for environmental economists.  As to the personal control 
variables,  only  political preferences  influence the dependent variable significantly. 
Specifically,  right-wingers  are  more prepared than students voting  for other parties  to 
decrease their donation level in choice 2. The coefficient of the dummy “Right-wing” is 
actually the largest one (almost 15 SEK), pointing to the economic significance of political 
preferences for behavior. 
When considering equation 2 (and thus the difference between own donation and restriction 
imposed on others), the expectations about others’ donations are no longer important. On the 
other hand, in equation 2, the coefficient of both education dummies is  positive and 
significant, implying (in line with Result 6) that economists  are more likely to state a 
restriction closer to their own preferences.  
4. Conclusion 
We have considered an augmented dictator game with a WWF project as the recipient. We 
placed the dictator in a group of four people and asked him to choose not only his own 
donation to the environmental project, but also the donation of his group and the other group 
members’ minimum donation. By using this design, we  mainly  aimed at answering the 
following two questions: Will dictators tend to impose their preferences on the others when 
they choose on behalf of the group? Will dictators restrict the others’ choices when such a 
restriction bears no monetary consequences for the dictators but affects the WWF project?  
The  answers to the above questions may be influenced  by the respondents’ education. 
Traditionally, economists are regarded as being more selfish and libertarian than others. It 
seemed therefore worth distinguishing  economics students from  students  with an 
environmental studies background.  
As to the first of our two main research questions, we find that while almost 2/3 of the 
subjects  do not modify their individual  donation when their decision  involves  the whole 
group, the remaining 1/3 decrease their individual donation. This decrease is positively 
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correlated with the expected difference between one’s own donation and the others’ average 
donation: dictators decrease more their individual donation, the less giving behavior they 
expect from the others. This result parallels that of Charness and Jackson (2009), who find 
that one-third of their population is sensitive to the issue of being responsible for another 
person’s welfare.  
As regards our second research question, our data shows that although most of the dictators 
apply a restriction, the imposed average restriction still leaves the others the opportunity to 
keep 2/3 of the initial endowment. It seems, therefore, that the decision makers do not want to 
impose their own preferences on other people, but they have a minimum level of donation 
that they deem as acceptable. This result suggests that individuals may be willing to grant 
freedom of choice (via larger choice sets), but only within certain limits: to some extent, they 
decide to the good of the orangutans at the expense of the payoff-maximizing choice of their 
fellow members. 
Finally, the analysis of behavior of the different student groups indicates that economists are 
different from environmental social scientists: they donate the least individually, have the 
lowest expectations about the others’ generosity, and impose restrictions on others’ choices 
that are closer to their own preferences. Hence, on the one hand our results are in line with 
the commonly accepted wisdom that economists are more selfish than non-economists, but 
on the other hand they question the claim that economists are more libertarians than others. 
Further work needs to be done in order to be confident about the generalization of these 
findings to other goods. But the experimental evidence garnered here, for an environmental 
good, suggests that the aversion to paternalism and to “doing good with other people money” 
that economics education tries to inculcate does not make economists more libertarian than 
others. 
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